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Article: 
Employee health benefits are a major payroll expense for companies that provide them. During the 1980s and 
90s, many employers moved workers into managed care programs to control costs. However, the ability of 
those mechanisms to contain healthcare inflation has run its course. Significant rate hikes in 2002 will cause 
some large employers to increase employee contributions anywhere from thirteen to twenty percent. Further, 
new legislation threatens to increase the pace of healthcare inflation and possibly make employers liable for the 
plans they offer. Therefore, some firms have already turned to Defined Contribution Health Plans (DCHPS) to 
control health benefit costs and limit their legal exposure. This paper describes two types of DCHPs that have 
emerged and analyzes their impact on employers, insurers, employees, and healthcare providers. The first type, 
based on individual Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) plus group-based catastrophic health insurance, may be 
workable if forthcoming legislation provides appropriate tax shelter treatment for both employers and 
employees. The second type, which involves straightforward voucher payments, is unlikely to work because it 
removes all vestiges of community rating and would therefore leave many classes of workers unable to obtain 
affordable health coverage.  
 
Employer-based health insurance has been a central element in U.S. compensation systems since World War II. 
Because of wage controls and severe labor shortages during the war, employers offered healthcare benefits to 
attract skilled workers. In order to expand the availability of employer-provided health insurance after the war, 
Congress created tax incentives that allowed employers to treat such benefits as tax-deductible costs. This 
lowered their corporate income tax liability on such benefits. However, by the turn of the century, the once 
modest cost of these benefits came to represent a major open-ended expense for many companies. In addition, 
employers are under pressure from employees dissatisfied with their access to healthcare. Political leaders at 
both the state and federal levels have responded to this concern by mandating high levels of specific healthcare 
services and by exposing insurers and employers to increased litigation risks for denial of services. The net 
effect of such legislation will almost certainly lead to increased health insurance expenses for both employers 
and their employees.  
 
The initial cost savings realized from the development of managed care organizations in the late 1980s and 
early 90s also now appear to have run their course. As a result, the cycle of health insurance premium increases 
are again moving back well above the general rate of inflation (Gabel et al., 2000). Therefore, employers are 
now looking for alternatives that will allow them to continue to provide healthcare benefits that better control 
their payroll costs and extricate them from the potential legal liabilities involved in proposed "patient bill of 
rights" legislation. Such alternative approaches must also retain the tax advantages associated with traditional 
managed care programs.  
 
One such emerging model is the defined contribution health plan (DCHP). Under the DCHP format, employers 
no longer directly offer one or more health insurance programs to their employees on a shared-cost basis. They 
simply provide a fixed-dollar wage supplement (the defined contribution), which employees can then use as 
they see fit to purchase their own healthcare services. Under this approach, the healthcare incentives and costs 
facing various cohorts of employees will undergo significant changes. Although the direct costs to employers 
may be stabilized, or possibly reduced in the short run (Battistella and Burchfield 1999), the long-run effects are 
not well understood. In addition, the overall employee cost of obtaining comparable healthcare may actually 
increase. Alternatively, consumers may elect to forgo many medical encounters, including some cost-effective 
visits, which may reduce the overall health status of the workforce. Identifying and analyzing such changes that 
DCHPs may create--for employers, insurers, employees, and healthcare providers--is the subject of this article.  
 
Recent Trends in Employer-based Healthcare Benefits  
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, most private and public employers that offered employee health 
benefits migrated from full indemnity plans toward managed care programs in an effort to contain their rising 
healthcare costs (Jensen et al., 1997). Under earlier full indemnity health programs, employers, via their 
insurers, allowed employees to choose their own healthcare providers and simply covered all or most of the 
costs they incurred on a fee-for-service basis. Co-payments were then introduced to create incentives for 
employees to help control healthcare expenses.  
 
As employee healthcare costs continued to spiral upward during the 1970s and 80s, employers migrated toward 
managed care programs in an effort to better control their health-related payroll expenses. Health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) emerged as the first major form of managed care. HMOs directed employees toward 
gatekeeper providers, usually in centralized locations, who in turn controlled healthcare costs by reducing the 
use of specialists, and other means. Most HMOs received fixed insurance (i.e., capitated) premiums that were 
either wholly or largely paid by employers. However, during the 1980s and 90s, many employees became 
disenchanted with HMOs because of the limited service levels and choices of providers they offered. 
Employers, in addition to having dissatisfied workers, were bearing the brunt of premium inflation rates for 
HMO coverage at the expense of corporate profits.  
 
To address both employee dissatisfaction and rising cost concerns, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) 
were then developed to offer employees a wider selection of healthcare providers on a contractually discounted 
fee basis. In this environment, many large and medium-sized employers, both public and private, now offer 
their employees a choice of health plan providers and share the rising costs of such plans via a variety of co-
payment devices. In fact, many large employers now provide employees a choice of selecting among a number 
of PPOs, HMOs, or other discounted fee-for-service plans. However, the cost of the least expensive option 
usually serves as the basis for the employer contribution (a level-dollar contribution). Therefore, employees can 
select a more expensive and comprehensive and/or flexible plan, and pay the marginal cost out-of-pocket. 
Although managed care succeeded in providing significant health cost containment benefits for employers in 
the 1990s, PPO and HMO insurance premiums have again begun to surge well above the level of general 
inflation (Gabel et al., 2000).  
 
Moreover, companies that continue to provide insurance benefits directly to employees may soon face legal 
liability. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provided legal protection to 
companies offering employer-based health insurance coverage. However, in a number of states, legislation has 
been implemented that imposes new standards on employers and allows employees to sue their employers for 
injuries resulting from malpractice or denial of care (Battistella, 1998). Numerous service coverage mandates 
have also been introduced by some legislatures (Jensen and Morrisey, 1999). For example, federal legislation 
now stipulates that insurers must pay for at least two days of post-partum hospitalization. In addition, the 
proposed national "Patient Bill of Rights," if passed, will create new administrative requirements, independent 
medical review hoards, and pecuniary damages for failure to comply with those boards' rulings (Bipartisan 
Patient Protection Act, 2001). All of these provisions will, by their nature, accelerate healthcare inflation rates. 
Such increased costs and the potential of anti-employer litigation have added momentum to the DCHPs 
movement (Battistella and Burchfield, 1999).  
 
 
 
Emergence of DCHPs  
ERISA legislation was originally intended to expand employee retirement benefits in two ways. First, it 
provided incentives for more employers to provide benefits. Second, it encouraged a new type of pension plan 
designed to vest more employees, earlier in their lives, than traditional defined benefit pensions. The new 
pension arrangement was a defined contribution plan, the most common forms of which are the 401(k), 403(b), 
and Individual Retirement Account (IRA).  
 
Overall, the new pension plan approach was successful in expanding the number of vested employees in the 
ERISA workforce, from about thirty percent in 1972 to roughly half of today's workforce. There are two aspects 
of defined contribution pension plans that may also foreshadow trends in the DCHP market. First, the income 
replacement rates for defined contribution retirement plans can be lower than those of defined benefit plans, in 
some cases up to eight percent less for major employers (Abraham and Schneider, 1998). This means more 
employees now have pension plans, but the cost to employers is more predictable and better controlled. In 
addition, the risk of managing the pension benefit portfolio has been shifted from the employer to the employee 
(Patterson, 1999). The net effect of these two changes is that employees need to be well educated about their 
retirement investment alternatives in order to achieve comparable results to employer-managed defined benefit 
pension plans.  
 
One major hurdle facing any form of DCHP is that the current tax code needs to mirror the retirement plan 
model. Two significant changes would have to be made to overcome this hurdle. First, employers would have to 
be able to pass any defined health contribution to employees as a tax-deductible expense of doing business. 
Second, if health voucher payments went to employees as taxable income, the employees would face additional 
income and social security taxes; and the latter would have to be matched by the employer. This adverse tax 
consequence must also be corrected. If both of these conditions could be met, the tax incentives to employers 
and employees would be comparable to the status quo in pension plans. Two types of DCHPs have already 
emerged which are similar to some of the historic innovations in the pension plans described above. One is the 
Medical Savings Account (MSA), which is similar to the 401(k) and IRA models in many respects (Pallarito, 
1997). The other mechanism is a voucher system, where employees are given a fixed sum that is earmarked for 
health insurance; and they are responsible for going into the market and making the purchase. Each of these 
mechanisms is discussed, in turn, below.  
 
Medical Savings Accounts and Catastrophic Coverage  
Under most proposals, including the current Congressional MSA demonstration plan, individuals or their 
employers make tax-exempt deposits to MSAs that become the personal property of the employee. Coupled 
with the MSA is a catastrophic health plan (CHP) that is similar to traditional managed care insurance with a 
highly elevated deductible amount and much lower premiums. The CHP would probably be offered through the 
employer, thus retaining the economies of scale and tax benefits associated with such an arrangement.  
 
Employees use the MSA by withdrawing money to pay routine or discretionary medical expenses or purchase 
additional health insurance without any penalty. Money not spent on healthcare would grow with interest and 
could be used for future medical expenses. Alternative proposals would broaden the uses of residual MSA funds 
and would allow them to be used after retirement, rolled over into an IRA, put it into a pension plan, or left as 
part of an individual's estate.  
 
A federal demonstration program permitted the sale of 750,000 MSA policies from January 1997 through 
December 2000 in the United States. However, only 54,000 MSAs had actually been sold by December of 
1998. Matthews and Strayer (1999) cite five reasons for the low MSA adoption rate among consumers: (1) the 
initial program was only open to self-employed individuals or businesses with fewer than fifty employees, (2) 
the time limit discouraged insurers from entering a market that would only exist briefly, (3) the deductibles 
were set too high ($1,500 for individuals and $3,000 for families), (4) the tax exemption was only applicable to 
sixty-five percent of the deductible amount for individuals and seventy-five percent for families, and (5) only 
the employer or employee could contribute to an MSA, but not both. Two other possible explanations for the 
slow adoption of MSAs by consumers are their lack of understanding of MSA benefits and a lack of aggressive 
marketing by insurers (Government Accounting Office, 19 97). However, the House version of the Patient Bill 
of Rights extends the demonstration two years, increases the tax exemption to 100 percent, and increases the 
maximum number of employees to 100 percent, potentially resolving some of these issues (Bipartisan Patient 
Protection Act, 2001).  
 
Voucher Systems  
A second type of DCHP program involves the straightforward use of employer paid health insurance vouchers. 
In the simplest voucher system, each employee is paid a set amount of money annually to purchase health 
insurance. The workers are then personally responsible for finding an insurance plan that meets their needs. 
Healthy employees might choose less expensive plans, perhaps putting the difference between the voucher's 
value and the policy's premium in an MSA for later use. Alternatively, individuals at greater risk might select a 
more comprehensive plan and supplement the voucher's value with other discretionary income. Regardless of 
which plan an employee selects, "Vouchers are based on the belief that consumers--not their employers--are in 
the best position to know what kind healthcare they need and how much they want to spend for it." (Caudron, 
2000, p. 35)  
 
Currently, the federal government itself is one of the few large organizations that offers its employees a form of 
voucher program. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) is very popular and has been touted as 
a solution to both employee-based insurance and Medicare's problems. Rather than peg the employer's 
contribution to the lowest-priced plan available, it is set at either the median price of all plans, or the average of 
the two most expensive HMO options. Under this system, federal employees "tend to be pragmatic in their 
health selections: inexpensive health maintenance organizations when they're young and healthy, and a plan 
with good drug benefits after they retire and go on Medicare." (Murray, 2000, p. A1) However, in recent years 
the FEHBP's average premium has increased dramatically; and 2000 rates were 9.3 percent greater than the 
prior year (Yoder 1999). Further, few private companies have the resources or the scale to adopt the federal 
model and negotiate with numerous insurers. Nevertheless, if vouchers or MSA/CHPs become widely available, 
they will impact employers, insurers, employees, and providers in important ways.  
 
Implications of DCHPs for Employers, Insurers, Employees, and Providers  
Analyzing the effects of changing from a system based on defined benefits to one where DCHPs play a major 
role is, to say the least, complex. One way of viewing such effects is to trace possible changes from the 
employer contribution through to the actual consumption of healthcare services by employees. Each phase has a 
number of possible moderating factors that may promote or compromise employers' adoption of such plans. 
Further, the long-run effects may be different than the short-run effects in some phases of the process.  
 
The following scenario for analyzing the introduction of DCHPs on overall health-care spending is based on 
four broad questions. First, what is the short-run effect on employer spending for health-related services? The 
next three questions address the long-run implications of adopting DCHPs. How will changes in employee-
insurance company relationships affect the labor market? How are changes in employees' healthcare 
consumption patterns likely to impact employers under a DCHP paradigm? Finally, what affect will DCHPs 
have on aggregate healthcare costs?  
 
How Will DCHPs Affect Short-Run Employer Spending?  
The most readily apparent change in payment paths between defined benefit plans and DCHPs occurs in the 
first step. Rather than having the employer act as the employee's agent in dealing with the insurance market, 
they simply will pass healthcare funds directly to the employee. Initially, employers may either give employees 
a voucher comparable to the current level-dollar contribution, or they may potentially enjoy a one-time 
reduction in healthcare payroll expenses through the MSA/CHP model (Battistella, 1998). It is interesting to 
note that when employee benefit managers were given a specific MSA/CHP model for consideration, "a 
substantial majority of respondents indicated support," according to a survey by Pauly, Percy, Herring, and 
Rosenbloom (2000).  
 
In the short-run, compensation wage differential theory posits that any employer savings in healthcare spending 
would eventually be returned to employees as real wages under the MSA/CHP model (Zabinski et al., 1999). 
The effects of this are that--absent the aforementioned tax code revision--employers would be moving from a 
tax-free benefit to a taxable benefit and therefore have to contribute the initial DCHP amount plus taxes, thus 
increasing total payroll costs. To the extent employees are able to retain some of their MSA funds and transfer 
them to a pension or some other form of disposable income, this amount may initially be less than their current 
compensation package (wages plus benefits). Employees who consume large amounts of healthcare under a 
MSA/CHP, and therefore must purchase extra insurance with taxed wages, would presumably have to receive 
additional wages to return them to their pre-DCHP defined benefit position. However, awareness of such 
compensation wage differentials assumes perfect knowledge, and several studies have indicated that healthcare 
consumers typically lack this level of sophistication (e.g., Nelson et al., 2000; David et al, 2000; Newhouse et 
al., 1981; Davidson et al., 1992).  
 
Under a voucher system, most employers are not likely to enjoy any one-time savings. Further, if they adopt the 
FEHBP model and set the voucher's value equal to some percentage of the median price of all plans offered, 
rather than the lowest priced plan, a one-time increase in costs may occur. In addition, employers may choose to 
administer the plan by contracting with a third party "Qualified Health Benefit Purchasing Coalition" to 
overcome the loss of community rating inherent in offering only a couple of plans. The current House version 
of the Patient Bill of Rights establishes provisions for the development of such organizations. However, using 
such a purchasing coalition adds an additional administrative expense and will increase the cost of insurance.  
 
How Will Changes in the Employee--Insurance Company Relationship Affect Labor Markets?  
The employee-insurance company relationship will be a significantly different paradigm than the current 
employer-insurance company model. The search, negotiation, and acceptance of plans will all be different. Each 
of these aspects is considered in the order they typically occur.  
 
Addressing the voucher model first, the change in the scale of the participants will greatly affect the system. 
First, consider the cost to the searcher, or employee, for their time spent searching. Because, they lack the time 
or ability to compare every group plan in the market, the way many employers do, it is likely that they will 
make suboptimal purchase decisions and either pay more or receive less services than under the traditional 
model. Individual employees will also lack the leverage that large employers enjoy and therefore will likely pay 
a higher price for the same services their employer could have purchased on a group basis. In addition, there is 
evidence that employees appreciate the role their employer plays as agent (Peele et al., 2000). This may give 
employers providing traditional defined benefit plans an advantage in competing for employees in tight labor 
markets, compared to those offering vouchers. Alternatively, companies offering defined benefit plans may 
attract less healthy workers or those with larger families, thus experiencing an adverse selection effect and 
increased healthcare costs.  
 
A potential concern for employers of moving to a pure voucher system is that alternative purchasing models 
administered by labor unions may arise under the aforementioned purchasing coalition provision of the 
proposed Patient Bill of Rights. Unions possess the necessary infrastructure and organizational skills to support 
such programs. Further, unions may adopt the issue in the hopes of unionizing businesses that are currently non-
unionized. The potential cost of this phenomenon to employers without union contracts could be considerable in 
both real wages and management freedom. Union workers typically earn a twenty percent premium compared 
to non-unionized employees (Batt 2001). Further, strong unions can impinge upon management's operational 
autonomy and may do so by demanding a return to defined benefit health insurance plans. Therefore, employers 
could potentially end up with a more heavily unionized workforce, without having divested the high cost and 
legal liabilities associated with defined benefit health insurance plans.  
 
Under the alternative MSA/CHP model, search costs, economies of scale, and adverse selection problems are all 
less serious than under a pure voucher system. First, the CHP part may continue to be offered through the 
employer, thus optimizing the search effort. In addition, keeping MSA/CHPs with the employer maintains 
current scale economies and negotiation effects, as they exist today. Doing so also benefits both the employees 
and insurers. From an insurance company's perspective, the adverse selection problem is kept in check, and 
perhaps ameliorated, to the extent that individuals must first exhaust their own discretionary health funds. From 
the employee's perspective, the problem of purchase decision sub-optimization is also mitigated because the 
effect is not felt unless they exceed their deductible and use the catastrophic coverage.  
 
There is a third scenario where employers offer multiple plans, including both traditional plans and an 
MSA/CHP option. In this situation, insurers could face greater market segmentation (Pauly et al., 2000). 
Because MSA/CHPs will logically draw the relatively healthy workers, traditional plans will experience adverse 
selection, leading them to increase their premiums. As premiums in regular health insurance plans increase, 
more people will then be induced to take the less expensive MSA/CHP option. This cycle of segmentation that 
crowds out low-deductible indemnity plans has been referred to as a "death spiral" (Pauly and Herring, 2000). If 
the death spiral scenario occurs, those employees who consume the greatest amount of healthcare services will 
either face greater financial exposure or have to alter their behavior, as discussed below.  
 
What Affect Will DCHPs Have on Employee Healthcare Consumption Patterns?  
Moving from traditionally defined benefit plans to DCHPs should remove many of the moral hazards or 
incentives for individuals to over-consume health services they would not normally have consumed had they 
been using their own disposable income. Therefore, they will presumably consume less. However, from a 
workers' health perspective, reductions in the consumption of important preventive services, such as annual 
physicals, immunizations, and cancer screening, may also lead to less healthy populations of employees and 
increased sick days.  
 
Another way in which moral hazards are created in traditional defined benefit plans is through cross 
subsidization. Most managed care programs supported by employers implicitly force healthy single and young 
nonsmoking employees to subsidize the health costs of older employees, those with large families, smokers, and 
chronically ill workers. This occurs because traditional co-payment plans almost never adjust the employee's 
share of health plan costs based on age or the employee's health habits and history. Because older and 
chronically ill employees impose disproportionately high costs on health programs, while paying the same flat-
rate fees, an intercohort subsidy exists. Also, most healthcare programs--as opposed to life insurance policies--
do not charge smokers more for their coverage, even though their absenteeism and sickness costs exceed those 
of non-smokers. The non-smokers, therefore, subsidize the smokers. Moreover, even though workers with 
covered families typically pay somewhat higher co-payments than single employees, the family payment 
charges are rarely adjusted on a specific size-of-family basis. This provides a cross subsidy to large families at 
the expense of small families. Even if employers pay family-head employees more than single employees, most 
such inter-cohort subsidies are diminished or disappear when a straightforward flat health benefit payment is 
made to employees in lieu of community-rated managed care plans.  
 
In the broadest terms, the elimination of such cross-subsidies promotes two desirable outcomes for employers, 
but it produces both adverse and positive consequences to society as well. First, because families will face the 
full healthcare cost of every additional member, the incentive will be to have fewer children (Leibowitz, 1990), 
thus reducing the concomitant maternity benefits and costs that employers now pay that segment of the 
workforce. The downside to this, from a societal perspective, is that families in the best position to support 
children are economically deterred from doing so. Second, the struggle to get Americans to adopt healthy 
behaviors has to date relied solely on the intrinsic benefit of an improved quality of life. Under a DCHP system 
where employees interact directly with their insurers, it seems likely that the insurers would provide monetary 
disincentives, via elevated premiums, for unhealthy behaviors such as smoking, drug abuse, and so on. Further, 
insurers might also penalize individuals for secondary indicators of unhealthy behaviors such as a sedentary 
lifestyle or poor diet by screening for obesity and elevated cholesterol levels. Improving any of these factors 
would be beneficial to employers from a lost productivity perspective, but only to the extent that affected 
employees would actually respond to higher healthcare costs by adopting healthier lifestyles. Further, this 
potential benefit is consistent with society's goal of having healthier and more productive individuals.  
 
How Will DCHPs Affect Healthcare Inflation?  
Healthcare providers, physicians in particular, drive most health related expenditures--whether it is via a 
hospital admission, writing a prescription, or conducting an outpatient visit. They do this via their decisions to 
administer various levels of care. In addition, they are very unhappy with the status quo of managed care health 
insurance. Employer-based insurance has been derided by healthcare providers for limiting choice and 
interfering with the physician-patient relationship. For example, Nancy Dickey, a past president of the 
American Medical Association (AMA), stated that, "our plan for health system reform has four primary goals:  
expanding choice, individual selection and ownership of healthcare plans, defined contributions to fund these 
options, and developing an approach for making it happen" (1998, p. 1045). Therefore, it seems likely that 
many healthcare providers would welcome the DCHP alternatives discussed thus far.  
 
A potential benefit of having employees directly pay for services is that healthcare providers would no longer 
be forced to serve as the agents for themselves, insurers, consumers, and employers. Under the current third-
party payer system, there is little real incentive for providers to contain costs. Instead, insurers "manage" care 
through a variety of utilization review and gatekeeper mechanisms. One potential benefit of putting employees 
directly in the payment path, via DCHPs, is that some physicians may return to means-testing on an individual 
basis. Prior to the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid, physicians often made use of sliding-fee scales based 
on a patient's ability to pay (Epstein, 1997). Such a change might remove a significant part of the agency 
problem, encourage more cost effective practice patterns, and keep healthcare inflation more in line with 
general inflation. The MSA/CHP model seems particularly well suited to addressing such agency problems.  
 
Conclusions  
Based on the foregoing, it appears the widespread adoption of DCHPs would generate a major shift in the 
current employer-based health insurance system. Assuming the tax incentive issue will be favorably resolved, 
the two alternatives described, vouchers and MSA/CHPs, have significantly different implications for 
employers. As noted above, the voucher system has several inherent limitations that need to be resolved, while 
the MSA/CHP model has some promise.  
 
The implementation of pure voucher systems on a wide basis would probably lead to an increased number of 
employed, but uninsured Americans. This phenomenon would occur because the value of vouchers, if pegged to 
general inflation or the consumer price index, would not keep pace with health care inflation. The employee 
would then face the cost difference between the voucher's value and the price of health insurance using after-tax 
income. Many employees would find this expense either prohibitive or of less value than other discretionary 
expenditures. If voucher values are not pegged to the least expensive plan, the incentive is to maximize the 
employer's payment because the individual does not face the full marginal cost of more expensive plans. This 
phenomenon has been evident in the Medicare program, where individuals purchase Medi-gap insurance 
because they only pay a fraction of the actual cost of services rendered and Medicare pays the balance. This in 
turn leads to increased utilization and inflation. Such a cycle of inflation may cause more small employers to 
drop healthcare benefits altogether as they became prohibitively expensive.  
 
Alternative models, where third-party entities create large risk pools and where employees select a plan 
subsidized with employer funds, may mitigate this problem and increase consumer choice. Further, such a 
model could shield employers from litigation, but at the cost of another layer of administrative expense. Failing 
to overcome these limitations and leaving more Americans uninsured may also lead to more strident calls for a 
national health insurance plan, as well as placing greater strains on state-run safety-net programs.  
 
Making a voucher system feasible would require extensive revision of tax codes at both the state and federal 
level to maintain the status quo of employer based health insurance. Given the difficulty of enacting the 
Patient's Bill of Rights, which is modest by comparison, voucher insurance mechanisms seem unlikely to 
resolve employers, insurers, providers, or employees' concerns with the current systems of managed care, at 
least in the short run.  
 
If MSA/CHP insurance were introduced on a wide scale, it would probably displace other forms of insurance as 
healthy workers opted in, leaving only the riskier employees in the defined benefit plans. The cost of those 
plans would increase accordingly, forcing more and more people into the MSA/CHP model. Nevertheless, the 
reduction of agency problems among providers, via the MSA/CHP approach, may help correct the market 
failures that have, on average, kept healthcare inflation rates above those of general inflation over the past 
twenty years.  
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